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THRESHOLDS OF HARM IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LITIGATION: THE MICHIGAN ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION ACT AS MODEL OF A MINIMAL
REQUIREMENT
Robert H. Abrams*

The Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970 (MEPA)I creates a broad private cause of action by which citizens and other entitiescan prevent environmental degradation. As with all statutes, the scope
of MEPA's coverage is a critical issue in determining its effectiveness.
The central argument of this article is that MEPA, in contrast to other
environmental legislation, is intended to govern an extraordinarily wide
variety of cases unfettered by a substantial threshold of harm
requirement.
Securing MEPA and statutes like it from undue restrictions is a
particularly timely concern, given the recent curtailment of other environmental remedies. In the last two terms, the United States Supreme
Court has significantly narrowed the scope of federal common law protection of interstate resources' and has held that two federal statutes
allow no implied private rights of action to prevent marine pollution,"
These cases reaffirm the importance of state-created environmental remedies; the courts should not, without reasoned justification, restrict private causes of action established expressly to address environmental
concerns by statutes such as MEPA.
Part I advances the article's central contention, that MEPA's broad
scope should not be restricted by substantial threshold of harm requirements. The focus is on MEPA's unusually clear legislative history. Part
II of the article shows that the courts have not found MEPA to require
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1. Environmental Protection Act of 1970, MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201.1207 (Supp. 1982).
2. ld. § 691.1202(1).
3. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (Milwaukee II). See generally
Bleiweiss, Environmental Regulation and the Federal Common Law of Nuisance: A Proposed Standard ofPreemption, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 41 (1983).
4. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981). See infra note 13.
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a threshold, and Part III demonstrates that the statute, as administered,
provides little justification for fears that MEPA will lead to unnecessary
litigation over trivial resources. Part IV compares MEPA both with state
legislation similar to it and with federal environmental protection statutes
quite different in function and approach. Part IV also asserts that a broad
private right of action serves a unique purpose and filIs an important gap
in the range of legislative tools furthering environmental protection.
Michigan's courts should continue to respect its legislature's intentional
choice of this technique. The article concludes with a brief articulation
of factors apparently at play in the courts' ad hoc decisions to date,
which may serve as a more certain guide to both courts and litigants in
determining under what circumstances MEPA was intended to be
available.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF MEPA

MEPA authorizes any "legal entity," ranging from state agencies to
corporations or individual citizens, to sue any other legal entity to obtain
relief from actual or potential "pollution, impairment or destruction" of
the "air, water and other natural resources and the public trust therein."!
The statute does not require that the plaintiffs bringing suit have an
economic interest in the outcome of the case. Once suit has been brought,
courts may determine the "validity, applicability and reasonableness" of
relevant state or local pollution standards," and may mandate the promulgation of new standards.' Although damages are not available under the
statute, MEPA provides both declaratory and injunctive relieffor threatened or existing harm."
MEPA defendants may, of course, introduce evidence to rebut a
plaintiff's prima facie case, but the statute also provides an affirmative
defense. To raise this defense the defendant must show that there is "no
feasible and prudent alternative" to the conduct in question, and that this
conduct is "consistent with the promotion of the public health, safety
and welfare in light of the state's paramount concern for the protection
of its natural resources. "9
Finally, MEPA establishes no threshold of harm requirement. Instead, the Act defines a violation as the "impairment" of a "natural
resource. "10 The statute leaves these terms undefined; thus, at least in
theory, the courts could apply the statute to the smalIest instances of
environmental harm. II Even if these terms are interpreted less expan5. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 691.1202(1) (Supp, 1982).
6. Id. § 691.1202(2).
7.Id.
8. Id. § 691.1202(1).
9. Id. § 69I.1203(1).
10. Id. § 691.1202(1).
11. MEPA's drafJers intended the courts to articulate the statute's broad purpose.
Sax. Pierce & Irwin. Thoughts on H.R. 3055. Historical Collection. infra note 16, Box I
File 2.
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sively, MEPA's private right of action and lack of a threshold provision
allow the courts to regulate a wide range of both prospective and existing
harm. MEPA has become a prominent statute. Initially, it pioneered the
field of legislatively created, broad-based substantive environmental
rights. Subsequently, several states have modelled legislation on
MEPA.12 In recent years, the importance of state statutes like MEPA
has been heightened by the decline in federal legal protection of the
environment, evinced both by the conservative attitude of the Supreme
Court toward environmental class actions" and the reduction in funding
for environmental protection programs." State environmental protection
laws like MEPA are, therefore, increasingly important. IS
II. MEPA's LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THEDECISION TO EXCLUDE A
THRESHOLD OF HARM
MEPA's unusually clear legislative history" confirms that the Michigan legislature considered and rejected the imposition of a threshold of
12. See infra text accompanying note 102.
13. The Supreme Court's decision in Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v, National
Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. I (1981), is a recent example of this restrictive attitude. In
an action brought by shell fishermen to enjoin public authorities from discharging pollutants
into local fishing grounds, the Court ruled that "elaborate enforcement provisions," id. at
13, under both the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980),and
the Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980), preempted other related forms of relief. In light of Congress's
intent to "provideD precisely the remedies it considered appropriate," 453 U.S. at 15, the
Court held inter alia that the federal common law of nuisance was inapplicable, and that
the statutes imply no private rights of action. Id, at 13-22.Commentary on Sea Clammers
has suggested that "the decision seems entirely to preclude the possibility of finding an
implied remedy where the statute provides some express remedy, no matter how minimal."
Note, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 39, 44 (1982).
The Court cited its decision in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II). 451 U.S.
304 (1981), in support of its holding that "the federal common law of nuisance in the area
of water pollution is entirely pre-empted by the more comprehensive scope of the [Clean
Water Act]." 453 U.S. at 22. The Court gave identical treatment to MPRSA. Id. See also
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v, Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-24 (1979) (no implied
private cause of action under § 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940);Touche Ross
& Co. v, Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568-79(1978) (no implied private cause of action under
§ 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
14. Peterson, Laissez-Faire Landscape, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31. 1982, § 6 (Magazine),
at 27, 32, col. 4.
15. In contrast to the limited view of the place of private rights of action asserted in
Sea Clammers, MEPA was predicated on the public trust doctrine advanced by Professor
Joseph Sax. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). The basis of the doctrine is that because all
natural resources are held in trust for the people by the government, any environmental
degradation is actionable unless it is sanctioned by specific legislation. [d. Hence, MEPA
establishes a new substantive right enforceable in much the same way as a property or
contract right. See Sax & Connor, Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A
Progress Report, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1003, 1005(1972).
16. MEPA's legislative history has been preserved in far greater detail than that of
most other Michigan enactments. The published records of the Michigan legislature are
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harm requirement. Even in its formative stage, MEPA was conceived as
a broadly applicable tool that was not to be restricted by a high threshold
of harm requirement, a choice expressly adopted by the legislature in its
subsequent deliberations.
Originally, the West Michigan Environmental Action Council
(WMEAC), a citizens' organization, approached Professor Joseph Sax
with the idea of drafting an environmental protection statute. Its first
proposal was that a special environmental review board be established
to monitor environmental decisions made within the state.'? Professor
Sax counselled against such an arrangement. Review boards, he argued,
were too often captives of political and economic constituencies, -and
could not be relied upon to guard the diverse public interests involved
in environmental protection. Sax suggested instead that prudent environmental decisionmaking at every level, in both the public and private
sectors, could best be overseen by the judiciary with the help of citizen
suits." Such an arrangement would subject all questionable environmental decisionmaking to judicial review.
Despite the breadth of the original bill,'? the legislature and other
actors on several occasions paid particular attention to the question of
the degree of harm a plaintiff should be compelled to show in order to
advance a prima facie case under MEPA. Michigan Attorney General
Frank Kelley, for example, initially opposed MEPA because he feared
that the liberal standing provisions would combine with the lack of a
threshold of harm to encourage spurious litigation." For similar reasons,
the powerful Michigan Chamber of Commerce proposed amendments
that would have required a precise legislative definition of "natural
resources'?' and would have subjected all MEPA claims to prescreening
by the Attorney General, who would then prosecute only the "substantial" cases on behalf of the plaintiffs.t' These amendments never advanced beyond the committee stage.
only logs of votes taken and occasional reports of speeches by legislators. The records do
not include reprints of committee reports. Material on MEPA is available mainly because
the statute's author, Professor Joseph Sax of the University of Michigan Law School,
donated his papers relating to MEPA to the Michigan Historical Collection. These papers
are available to the public at the Bentley Historical Library of the University of Michigan,
under the heading "Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970" [hereinafter cited as
Historical Collection]. A law review note appearing shortly after MEPA's enactment also
recounts the legislative history of the Act in considerable detail. Note, Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970.4 MICH. J.L. REFORM 358 (1970).
17. Letter from Joan Wolfe to Joseph Sax (Jan. 28, 1969), Historical Collection,
supra note 16, Box I File 2.
18. See generally J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1970).
19. H.B. 3055, 1969MtCH. HOUSE BILLS 2480, Historical Collection, supra note 16,
Box I File 17.
20. Attorney General Frank J. Kelley, Analysis of H.B. 3055, Apr. 21, 1969, Historical Collection, supra note 16, Box I File 14.
21. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce Special Legal Subcommittee Recommended Amendments for H.B. 3055, Proposed Amendment I (Mar. 4, 1970), Historical
Collection, supra note 16, Box I File 9.
22. [d. Proposed Amendment II.
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The office of the Governor also became involved with the MEPA
legislation, most significantly through a substitute bill proposed by the
Governor's Legal Advisor, Joseph Thibodeau.P The substitute would
have introduced the qualifier "unreasonable" to describe the level of
"pollution, impairment or destruction" actionable under the statute.> The
House Committee on Conservation and Recreation adopted this substitute bill and reported it out of committee.
The proposed alteration received a mixed response. Professor Sax
felt that the addition of a "reasonableness" standard would not greatly
alter the working of the statute, because he thought that the courts would
exercise their common-law discretion to produce a threshold of harm
anyway.> In contrast, several members of the MEPA coalition believed
that insertion of the term "unreasonable" would make the provision
unduly restrictive and highly manipulable." Those desiring to. remove
the term "unreasonable" from the substitute bill understood that the
debate itself would have a lasting impact. One WMEAC member later
observed that if "the word [were] given significance in the history of the
legislation, it would be given more significance in the courts.?"
By this time public attention had focused on the bill. Extensive media
coverage and large turnouts at public hearings exposed the entire legislative process to an unusual degree of public scrutiny. 28 The political
process, including a sense of legislative accountability not always evident
in state houses, was at work. Although at first the full Michigan House
of Representatives included the reasonability threshold in its final bill,29
it later voted by a narrow margin to delete the provision." In its final
form, MEPA easily was passed by both chambers of the Michigan
legislature.
Thus, the legislature's decision to exclude an explicit threshold of
harm requirement from MEPA was deliberate and well-considered. Although the legislature did not altogether preclude the common law development of a threshold, it apparently intended that no substantial
threshold be imposed. This express legislative determination to delete all
limitations based on degree of harm provides important information concerning the threshold issue and emphasizing MEPA's broad applicability.

23. Mr. Thibodeau later wrote critically of MEPA and its lack of a threshold requirement. See Thibodeau, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: Panacea or
Pandora's Box, 116 Congo Rec. S16,247 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970), reprinted in 48 J. URB.
L. 579 (1971).
24. Substitute for House Bill 3055, Historical Collection, supra note 16, Box 1 File
18.
25. Sax, Pierce & Irwin, supra note 11.
26. J. WOLFE, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILL3055 13, (1970) Historical Collection, supra
note 16, Box 2 File 5.
27. [d.
28. [d. at 14. See also 1970 MICH. HOUSE J. at 1294.
29. J. WOLFE, supra note 26, at 14; Note, supra note 46, at 364.
30. See Note, supra note 16, at 368; see also DiMento, Brief Biographical Sketch of
MEPA, Bentley Historical Collection Catalog, at 28-31.
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III. EXPERIENCE UNDER MEPA
A. Judicial Interpretation of the Threshold of Harm
The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the broad scope of MEPA
when, in Ray v. Mason County Drain Commlssioner." it rejected a due
process challenge to the statute based in part on vagueness: "[T]he
Legislature spoke as precisely as the subject matter permits and in its
wisdom left to the courts the important task of giving substance to the
standard by developing a common law of environmental quality."32 The
opinion continued, "[w]hile the language of the statute paints the standard
for environmental quality with a rather broad stroke of the brush, the
language is neither illusive nor vague."33
The Ray Court's acceptance of MEPA's intended breadth lends
credence to a low or nonexistent MEPA threshold requirement. However, the Court specifically claimed for the judiciary the role of articulating an "environmental common law," a role within which the courts
have ample room to prevent MEPA's extension to trivial cases. Indeed,
the courts themselves have shared this view. Despite sufficient opportunity to require that parties demonstrate a threshold level of environmental damage as a prerequisite to establishing their prima facie case,
little common law on this issue has developed." Similarly, no Michigan
case has attempted a crabbed definition of the undefined.statutory terms
as a means of limiting the statute's reach to "big cases."3S
For example, the Michigan Supreme Court could have defined
MEPA's threshold of harm in Ray. 36 There, however, the Court refused
to give the threshold explicit definition, and instead held that a threat to
the continued existence of a "unique quaking forest?" met whatever
threshold the statute imposed." The uniqueness of the resource at stake
seems to have formed the basis of the court's ruling.
The Michigan Supreme Court recently had another opportunity to
establish an explicit threshold. In West Michigan Environmental Action
Council v. Natural Resources Commission (Pigeon River),39 the defen31. 393 Mich. 294. 224 N.W.2d 883 (1975).
32. [d. at 306.224 N.W.2d at 888.
33. /d. at 306 n.IO. 224 N.W.2d at 888 n.IO.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 39-63.
35. Compare infra text accompanying note 126 & note 131.
36. In reviewing MEPA cases on the merits. the Michigan Supreme Court ordinarily
will address the threshold of harm issue only if that issue is assigned as error and the
court's grant of leave to appeal includes that issue. See MICH. GEN. CT. R. 853.2(1)(a).
Where the defendant argues that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. the court is free 10 say that the amount of environmental degradation
involved in the case is too slight to be actionable. The court may act in this way even if
the ostensible issue under review is whether a particular type of injury is actionable.
37. 393 Mich. 294. 310. 224 N.W.2d 883. 890 (1975).
38. [d.
39. 405 Mich. 741. 275 N.W.2d 538 (1979).
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dant oil company sought a permit to drill in an environmentally sensitive
area of the Pigeon River Country State Forest. Its defense to a MEPA
challenge to its plan was that none of the activities involved 'in drilling
would have sufficient impact to be characterized as "likely to pollute,
impair, or destroy" natural resources."
Although noting that "virtually all human activities can be found to
adversely impact natural resources in one way or another.'?" and accepting the defendant's statement of the issue as "when ... [an] impact
rise[s] to the level of impairment or destruction,"42 the Court held that
the plaintiff had established a prima facie case. Notably, the Court made
no attempt to define the statutory terms "impair" and "destroy" and took
no notice of how those terms had been defined in earlier cases. Rather,
the decision rested on the importance of the resources at stake in the
case: the proposed drilling might have interfered with the breeding habits
of the only sizeable elk herd east of the Mississippi River, and access
roads, noise, and odors would have -been introduced into an unusually
pristine area of Michigan's Lower Peninsula." The Pigeon River case
could have satisfied even the most stringent threshold of harm requirement. Thus, it cannot be viewed as a decision that will have any impact
on cases involving less significant resources or environmental values.
No other Michigan Supreme Court MEPA decision directly addresses the threshold issue, but the court's rulings that MEPA issues do
arise in the context of small-scale projects provide additional evidence
that plaintiffs do not need to demonstrate significant harm to establish a
prima facie case. In a case involving sewer routing, for example, the
supreme court ruled that possible pollution stemming from the route
chosen was actionable under MEPA.44 Similarly, MEPA was found to
extend to the injury alleged when a small segment of a proposed roadwidening project crossed swampland." A third case, Irish v. Green.":
was not an actual supreme court decision, but the court singled out that
lower court ruling as a model of the proper judicial response to factfinding and decisionmaking under MEPA.47 Irish involved a second home
development that affected' only two square miles of land." These

40. [d. at 750, 275 N.W.2d at 542. The company eschewed the affirmative defense
that no feasible and prudent alternatives to the activities were available. [d. at 764. 275
N.W.2d at 547 (Levin, J., dissenting).
41. [d. at 750, 275 N.W.2d at 542.
42. [d.
43. [d. at 755-56,275 N.W.2d at 543-44.
44. Eyde v. Michigan, 393 Mich. 453, 225 N.W.2d 1 (1975).
45. Michigan State Highway Comm'n v. Vanderkloot, 392 Mich. 159,220 N.W.2d
416 (1974).
46. Irish v. Green, 4 ENy'T REP. CAS. (BNA) 1402 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1972), reprinted
as appendix to Ray v. Mason County Drain Comm'r, 393 Mich. 314, 224 N.W.2d 892
(1975).
47. 393 Mich. at 313-14, 224 N.W.2d 891-92.
48. 4 ENy'T REP. CAS. (BNA) at 1402-03.
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decisions, which considered allegations of localized, low-level environmental harm, strongly suggest that if the court has imposed an implicit
threshold' of harm, it is a very low one.
Lower court decisions have also failed to define plaintiff's prima
facie case requirement. Few decisions have been widely reported. Even
fewer explicitly address the threshold issue." However, a review of the
facts of reported cases indicates that most allegations of even slight
environmental harm have passed the threshold. Such cases include proposed tree cutting along a short stretch of road," redesign of an important
intersection near Michigan State University," sandmining operations on
a little less than 100 acres of dune land," residential development on
various size tracts, including at least one case of under 80 acres" and
many pollution cases."
The leading case that adopts a more limited view of the threshold
issue is the Michigan Court of Appeals opinion in Kimberly Hills Neighborhood Association v. Dion.i? The case involved the residential development of an unspectacular eighteen acre tract located near the edge of
Ann Arbor. In sustaining the plaintiff's claim, the trial judge held that
the small pond and several old trees on the lot were natural resources
protected under MEPA;56 the project area also provided habitat for birds
and other wildlife, all deemed to be natural resources.57 The court did
not require the plaintiffs to establish that the parcel was in any way
unique and, indeed, found the species of wildlife and vegetation on the
parcel to be common to the area. 58

49. The fullest consideration given to the issue appears in the appeIlate decision in
Kimberly Hills Neighborhood Ass'n v. Dion, 114 Mich. App. 495, 320 N.W.2d 668 (1982).
See infra text accompanying notes 55-64.
50. Wilcox v, Board of Road Comm'rs, No. 7-237 (Calhoun County Cir. Ct. June 16,
1971).
51. Anderson v. Michigan State Highway Comm'n, No. 15,609-C (Mich. Cir. Ct.
1973)(discussed in Sax & DiMento, Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Year's Experience
Under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 38 (1976».
52. Lincoln Township v. Manley Bros., No. 74-001,113-CE(Berrien County Cir. Ct.
1974).
53. Environmental Action Council v, A. Reenders & Sons, Inc., No. 2737 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. May 6, 1974)(discussed in Sax & DiMento, supra note 51, at 13).
54. See generally Sax & DiMento, supra note 51, at 8 and app. E.
, 55. 114 Mich. App. 495, 320 N.W.2d 668 (1982), leave to appeal filed, No. 69570
(Mich. June 7. 1982). See also Gang of Lakes Envtl. Org. v. Gee, No. 7-562 (Mich. Cir.
Ct. June 22. 1975); Haynes, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act in its Sixth Year:
Substantive Environmental Law from Citizens' Suits, 53 J. URB. LAw 589,621 (1976).
56. Kimberly Hills Neighborhood Ass'n v. Dion, No. 79-16,452 CH, slip op, at 4
(Washtenaw County Cir. Ct. Mar. 28. 1979).
57. [d. at 4-5. The quantum of proof required of plaintiffs was minimal: a hawk and
some pheasants had been sighted on the parcel, and expert testimony suggested that the
parcel did provide a part of the habitat for those birds. Defendant admitted that site clearing
work would necessarily destroy some trees and vegetation.
58. [d. at 4-6.

1983]

Thresholds under MEPA

115

Relying on Pigeon River? and Ray /,0 the appellate court found that
the word "impair" imposed a threshold requirement. Although correctly
noting that "[p]roper application of the impairment standard as it pertains
to the preservation of animal and plant life does not limit conservation
only to resources that are 'biologically unique' or 'endangered.l'"! the
court found MEPA to have intended a "statewide perspective"62 and held
that allegations of adverse impacts on small numbers of animals of common species did not meet MEPA's threshold of harm.
The Kimberly Hills decision is flawed in several respects. First, the
court failed to consider the full range of previously decided MEPA
cases." Second, the court offered no justification for looking only to
statewide resource populations." Third, the court neglected to make even
a rudimentary search of MEPA's legislative history.
Overall, a review of the cases indicates that showings of very low
levels of actual or potential environmental damage have generally satisfied the courts. That the cases involving small degrees of harm have not
thoroughly analyzed the issue indicates that the courts have no apparent
problems in administering MEPA without a threshold or under an implicit
view that the threshold is minimal. Even the cases announcing a threshold
requirement have done little to explicate its content and have seldom
used the issue as the ground of decision.
B. MEPA's Focus on Alternatives
After a plaintiff has established his or her prima facie MEPA case,
the defendant may either rebut the plaintiff's evidence or raise the statutory affirmative defense of a lack of "feasible and prudent" alternatives
to the proposed course of action." Like rebuttal." establishing the affirmative defense has proven difficult.
59. See supra note 39.
60. See supra note 31.
61. 114 Mich. App. at 507, 320 N.W.2d at 673.
62.ld.
63. See Eyde v, Michigan, 393 Mich. 453, 455-56, 225 N.W.2d 1,3 (1975); Michigan
State Highway Comm'n v, Vanderkloot, 392 Mich. 159, 167,220 N.W.2d 416, 419 (1974).
64. See Ray v. Mason County Drain Comm'r, 393 Mich. 294, 306, 309, 224 N.W.2d
883, 888-89 (1975).
65. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. 691.1203(1) (Supp. 1982).
66. As the defense counsel in Kimberly Hills put it:
A single blade of grass is a natural resource, and when one thrusts a shovel into the ground one
will necessariJy destroy a blade of grass or two and thus destroy a natural resource. Clearly one
cannot deny that thrusting a shovel into the ground where grass is growing will destroy some
grass.

Reply Brief of Appellee at 7, Kimberly Hills Neighborhood Ass'n V. Dion, No. 79-16,452
CH (Washtenaw County Cir. Ct. Mar. 28, 1979). Although this obviously exaggerates the
burden on defendants, it does highlight the fact that few activities can be proven to have
no potential effects on the environment so long as a low threshold of harm is in use.
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The main function of the affirmative defense is to ensure that the
defendant has considered and can articulate valid reasons for rejecting
other courses of action. An affirmative defense will be raised only if the
threshold has been met. Accordingly, the success of the role of the
defense as a means to mandate concern about alternatives depends on
what degree of harm the threshold requires. If a low level of environmental harm satisfies the threshold, defendants will be forced to explore
alternative courses of action in a greater range of cases. If the threshold
is too low or nonexistent, however, fears arise that complex litigation
over alternatives will ensue, whereas the original project would have
involved only minimal environmental impact.
The critical language of the affirmative defense, "feasible and prudent
alternative," was adopted from the federal Transportation Act. 67 In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,68 the United States Supreme
Court interpreted that phrase to require not merely that the defendant
choose the preferable alternative, but required that DOT prove that
rejected alternatives affording greater parklands protection be beset with
unique problems that preclude their selection. Although MEPA cases
construing the affirmative defense are by no means numerous, several
decisions by the Michigan Court of Appeals confirm the stringency of
the requirements for establishing a successful affirmative defense."
The Court of Appeals' decision in Wayne County Health Department
v. Olsonite Corp.P? a case culminating a long history of repeated citizen
and regulatory complaints about odors emanating from defendant's painting operations," is particularly indicative. The health department easily
made its prima facie case;" the defendant contended that it had installed
a water curtain and that other alternatives were not feasible or prudent. 73
The court rejected the defense on the grounds that the defendant had
failed to conduct site-specific studies on the effect of various odor control
options, to make serious attempts to seek reductions in quoted prices for

67. Department of Transportation Act. § 4. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1976).
68. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). In proving that no alternative to the destruction of parkland
was feasible and prudent. the Department of Transportation was not allowed to rely upon
a simple comparison of options and its bald conclusion that the alternative selected was
best. Instead. the Department was instructed that it must show that non-parkland options
would engender "unique problems" preventing their selection. [d. at 416. A mere increase
in expense. or the need to increase the length of the road. was held to be insufficient to
carry the burden. [d. at 411.
69. See Haynes. supra note 55. at 622. See. e.g.. Oscoda Chapter of PBB Action
Comm.• Inc. v, Department of Natural Resources. 403 Mich. 215. 268 N.W.2d 240 (1978):
Wayne County Dep't of Health v. Olsonite Corp.• 79 Mich. App. 668. 263 N.W.2d 778
(1977): Anderson v, Michigan State Highway Cornm'n, No. 15609-C (Ingham County Cir.
Ct. June 27. 1973): Crandall v, Biergans, No. 884 (Clinton County Cir. Ct. Sept. 3. 1971).
70. 79 Mich. App. 668. 263 N.W.2d 778 (1977).
71. [d. at 676-77. 263 N.W.2d at 783.
72. [d.
73. [d. at 683-84. 263 N.W.2d at 786-87.

1983]

Thresholds under MEPA

117

control systems, or to earmark funds for the acquisition of additional
odor control equipment."
In another case, Crandall v. Biergans P a trial court also adopted a
stringent approach to the affirmative defense, even though the defense
was ultimately established. Relying heavily on expert testimony, the
defendant demonstrated that his efforts to mitigate environmental damage
from a hog raising operation had been effective and that the various
alternatives suggested by the plaintiffs had been tested and found unavailing." Olsonite and Crandall together indicate that the affirmative
defense is not easily maintained. They also suggest that expert testimony
and a demonstrated willingness to experiment with control or mitigation
techniques are essential factors in successfully raising the affirmative
defense.
The one Michigan Supreme Court case devoting extended discussion
to the affirmative defense did not, in fact, result in a holding on the
affirmative defense. Oscoda Chapter of PBB Action Committee, Inc. v.
Department of Natural Resources'! involved a proposal by state health
officials to bury PBB contaminated cattle in a clay-lined pit. The plaintiff
urged that incineration of the cattle was the preferable alternative and
hence mandated by MEPA.7s The Court held, however, that the defendant's proposed conduct would not result in pollution," thus eliminating
the need to debate the merits of the affirmative defense.
The decided cases demonstrate that the affirmative defense is hard
to establish without the aid of expert testimony and some significant time
at trial. If, as advocated, an exceedingly low threshold is employed under
MEPA, litigants and courts alike will often find that the crux of litigation
is the alternatives issue. In fact, this is salutary: the focus becomes how
best to improve decisionmaking instead of a nit-picking debate about how
much harm will ensue. The question remains whether these benefits can
be obtained without undue social cost.
C. Practical Experience under MEPA

A dozen years after its enactment, MEPA is generally regarded as
a success. The statute has, consistent with its purpose and language,
played a positive role in "protect[ing] ... the air, water and other natural
resources and the public trust therein from pollution, impairment or
destruction. "SO Before any substantial litigation had occurred under
74.. [d. at 703,263 N.W.2d at 796.
75. No. 844 (Clinton County Cir. Ct. Sept. 3, 1971).
76. [d.
77. 403 Mich. 215, 268 N.W.2d 240 (1978).
78. [d. at 229-30,268 N.W.2d at 246.
79. [d. at 230.268 N.W.2d at 246.
80. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 691.1202(Supp. 1982). See generally Haynes, supra
note 55; Sax, Developments Under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act - 1980
Update (unpublished manuscript).
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MEPA, however, some feared that plaintiffs would inundate the courts
with lawsuits, many of them frivolous.
These fears have proven to be unfounded." Only thirty-four cases
were filed in the first year the statute was in force, and by the end of the
third year only seventy-five." The total count of cases filed under MEPA
by January 1982 stood at 168,83 reflecting a decrease over the years in
the number of cases brought per year. The 119 cases filed under MEPA
during its first five years accounted for less than .02% of all civil cases
filed in Michigan." Clearly, the statute has not interfered with the efficient
processing of other judicial business, nor have a disproportionate amount
of judicial resources been expended on MEPA cases.
Few MEPA cases have been brought vexatiously or frivolously. Only
two notoriously frivolous cases arose during the first six years of the
statute's operation." Furthermore, MEPA's structure is conducive to
out-of-court settlement" because defendants, faced with the possibility
of court injunctions, often prefer to settle rather than to litigate. When
litigated, MEPA cases have produced little or no unusual delay."
Studies of MEPA's operation have shown that pollution cases comprise more than one-half of all MEPA litigation." Most remaining MEPA
cases are land use decisions involving either public or private land." The
use of MEPA has not been dominated by any particular type of plaintiff.
State and local officials, citizens' groups, environmental organizations,
and individual property owners all have availed themselves of the statute's liberal standing provisions.P' Somewhat surprisingly, public agen81. See Berset, Standing: A Barrier to the Achievement of Justice in Environmental
Litigation 66 (1970) (unpublished LI.M. thesis, Harvard University). Studies published at
various points since MEPA's passage reveal not a glut of litigation but an even flow of
cases spread throughout Michigan's trial courts. See Sax & Connor, supra note 15;
DiMento, Citizen Environmental Legislation in the States: An Overview, 53 J. URB. LAW
43 (1976).
82. See Sax & DiMento, supra note 53.
83. This figure comes from a personal file maintained by Professor Joseph Sax of the
University of Michigan Law School. The maintenance of this file is discussed in Sax &
Connor, supra note IS, at 1006.
84. See Haynes, supra note 55, at 593.
85. Roberts v. State (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1971),2 ENV'TREP. CAS. (BNA) 1612, afl'd in
part, rev'd in part. 45 Mich. App. 252, 206 N.W.2d 466, 5 ENV'T REP. CAS. (BNA) 1111
(1973)(suit brought under MEPA to enjoin all grants of automobile licenses and all highway
construction until automobile air pollution standards were adopted and enforced); Marshall
v. Consumers Power Co., No. C-I6-150 (Jackson County Cir. Ct. Mar. 28, 1973):
86. See Sax & Connor. supra note 15. at 1010 & 1012.
87. The average length of completed cases filed under MEPA was ten months; they
ranged in length from one to thirteen months. See DiMento, supra note 81.
88. See Sax, supra note 80. at 2-3. Professor Sax writes, "[b]ecause the Act speaks
explicitly of protecting air and water from pollution, cases involving air and water pollution
have not given rise to the threshold question ... ." See Haynes, supra note 55, at 628-31
(use of MEPA in pollution cases by county prosecutors).
89. See Sax & Connor, supra note IS, at 1090-91; Sax & DiMento, supra note 51, at
61-62; Haynes. supra note 55. at 692-95.
90. See Haynes. supra note 55. at 645.
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cies have invoked MEPA more often than have individuals or other
private organizations." Countersuits by MEPA defendants for malicious
prosecution or damages have been rare and almost always unsuccessful. 92
It is harder to ascertain whether the conduct of MEPA litigation has
proven inordinately expensive. Dated and unsystematically collected estimates place the cost of MEPA litigation to plaintiffs at about $10,000
per case." These estimates attribute 80% of the litigation expenses to
fees paid for experts and attorneys. Both are factors that are-likely to
increase dramatically with the length and complexity of the trial. In
comparison, the same study estimates that MEPA cases resolved without
trial, a result encouraged by the statute, cost plaintiffs an average of only
$2,000, with more than half of those cases costing less than $1,000. 94
These limited data indicate that MEPA cases are not inherently more
difficult or expensive to litigate than are others that require some expert
testimony, such as personal injury cases. Nonetheless, these costs may
partly explain why so few frivolous cases have surfaced. In general,
these statistics support the conclusion that MEPA has been used effectively and judiciously by many different parties, whether private, governmental, or commercial. As its drafters intended, it has served as a
vehicle for citizens' action. MEPA's success in establishing a practical
program of wide-ranging environmental protection strongly militates in
favor of retaining only a minimal threshold of harm.
Apart from the claimed inefficiencyof litigating small cases, the most
compelling argument for exempting cases of small harm from MEPA is
one based on fairness and efficiency. This argument emerges in the
context of MEPA's operation in a land use case. Arguably, even a
defendant who attempts to engage in an environmentally sound project
will have difficulty in establishing the affirmative defense because the
plaintiff can seek to force the defendant to demonstrate that any number
of alternative mitigation measures would not be feasible or prudent. This
possibility might provide a strong incentive for defendants to try to settle
with plaintiffs." However, the avoidance of litigation through a compromise that modifies plans according to a plaintiff's preferences will not
necessarily benefit the public, especially because the public's interest in
"responsible" development presumably has already been secured through
the zoning and permit process." Thus, the principal beneficiaries of a
MEPA settlement may not be the public at large, but rather parties who
are in a position to use MEPA to enhance the amenity value of their
holdings by forcing defendants to modify development plans."
91. See Sax & DiMento, supra note 51, at 59-61.
92. See Haynes, supra note 55, at 664.
93. See Sax & Dimento, supra note 53 at 51.
94.Id.
95. See Sax, supra note 80, at 21.
96. See generally T. SCHOENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW 426-27,436-41
(1982).
97. Of course, the outcome most beneficial to the plaintiff can also benefit the general
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In cases that actually reach litigation, the sound exercise of judicial
discretion and the advantages of a careful consideration of alternatives
either overcome or outweigh these disadvantages. Courts, especially
equity courts, have the power to refuse to enforce claims which are not
advanced in good faith." Specific examples of environmental benefits
gained through the MEPA-mandated evaluation of alternatives even in
small cases include the preservation of shade trees." the elimination or
minimization of siltation in local streams, 100 and the maintenance of small
areas of wildlife habitat in the project area. lUI The effect of a low threshold
of harm on the evaluation of alternatives, therefore, does not present a
strong argument that the threshold ought to be raised.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP OF MEPA TO OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL
STATUTES
Until now, MEPA has been discussed in isolation. Two factors
justify expanding this inquiry to encompass experiences under other
environmental protection statutes. First, a study of statutes modelled on
MEPA confirms the assessment that legislatively adopted low thresholds
of harm are workable and can be implemented by the judiciary. The fact
that some states have included higher thresholds of harm adds indirect
credence to the low threshold interpretation given to MEPA. More specifically, the discussion ofMEPA's sister statutes indicates that although
similar language can be given several different meanings, the statutes
have led to surprisingly little litigation, even in states with low thresholds.
Second, the study of selected federal environmental protection statutes reinforces the conclusion that a variety of statutory approaches can
be appropriately employed to attain varied underlying environmental
protection goals. This examination also suggests that low or non-existent
thresholds of harm are, at times, well suited to accomplishing legislative
goals.

A. Analogous State Statutes
Several states have enacted statutes which, like MEPA, grant citizens direct access to the judicial system for the purpose of protecting
public interest. Cf Lakeland Property Owners v, Town of Northfield. 3 ENV'T REP. CAS.
(BNA) 1893 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1972) (plaintiffs' improvement of water treatment benefited
general public in addition to improving their individual property).
98. This is often referred to as the "clean hands" doctrine. See D. DOBBS. HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 45-46 (1973).
99. Wilcox v, Board of Road Comm'rs, No. 7-237 (Calhoun County Cir. Ct. June 16,
1971).
100. Muha v. Union Lake Assocs., No. 2964 (Grand Traverse County Cir. Ct. Aug.
14.1972).
101. Kimberly Hills Neighborhood Ass'n v, Dion, No. 79-16,452 CH (Washtenaw
County Cir. Ct. Mar. 28. 1979).
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the environment and enforcing compliance with existing environmental
regulations.P' Reported legislative history indicates that the legislatures
in some of these states used MEPA as a model.l'" As with MEPA,
reported decisions construing these statutes are rare,'?' and of these
cases, few have dealt with the question of damage thresholds.

1. The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act
The substantive language of the Minnesota Environmental Rights
Act of 1971 (MERA)IOS mirrors MEPA and provides that any citizen of
the state may maintain a civil action for declaratory or equitable relief
"against any person, for the protection of the air, water, land, or other
natural resources located within the state, whether publicly or privately
owned, from pollution, impairment, or destruction ... ."106 Unlike
MEPA, however, MERA'a definition of environmental damage expressly
contains a modest threshold of harm. MERA defines "pollution, impairment, or destruction" as conduct which "violates, or is likely to violate,"
102. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-14 to -20 (West 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.412 (West 1971); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-6-1-1 to -6 (Bums 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 116B.l-.13 (West 1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:35A-l to -14 (West 1974); S.D. CODIFIEDLAWS ANN. §§ 34A-IO-1 to -15 (1973).
Two states with environmental citizen suit laws worthy of note but not explored
below include Massachusetts and Nevada. The Massachusetts statute, MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 214 § 7A (MichielLaw. Coop. 1973), defines damage to the environment as "any
destruction, damage or impairment, actual or probable, to any of the natural resources of
the commonwealth •.. :' [d. The statute does contain a number of limitations, however,
including a provision that "[d]amage to the environment shall not include any insignificant
destruction, damage or impairment," id., which, like New Jersey's insistence that damage
not be "frivolous," N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:35A-4(c) (West 1974), is intended to screen out
spurious suits. The Massachusetts statute further specifies as a prerequisite to the granting
of relief that the proposed conduct must constitute a violation of a statute, ordinance, or
regulation "the major purpose of which-is to prevent or minimize damage to the environment." MASS. ANN. LAWS ch, 214 § 7A (MichielLaw. Coop. 1973). Finally, the most severe
limitation is probably the requirement that at least ten domiciliaries of the state join as
plaintiffs. [d. A single citizen may bring suit under the other environmental protection
statutes that have been discussed. The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act is a typical
example: "Any person residing within the state •.. may maintain a civil action in the
district court for declaratory or equitable relief ... ." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116.03(1).
The Nevada statute is similar in purpose to the state statutes examined above but
significantly different in detail. Nevada's statute. NEV. REV.STAT. §§ 41.540-.570, provides
for private actions to enforce existing environmental regulations or statutes, but the action
cannot proceed unless the state or a governmental enforcement agency is joined as a party.
[d. § 41.540.
A notable California statute, CAL. Gov'r. CODE §§ 12600-12, is distinguished by the
fact that relief from environmental harm may be sought only through the Attorney General;
there is no provision in the statute by which citizens themselves may obtain relief.
103. See. e.g., Goldshore, A Thumbnail Sketch of the Environmental Rights Act,
N.J. STATE B.J., Winter 1975, at 18; Johnson, The Environmental Protection Act of 1971,
46 CONN. B.J. 422. 426 (1972).
104. With the exception of the Minnesota statute, none of the state statutes listed in
note 102, supra, has been cited in more than eight reported cases since enactment.
105. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116B.Ol-.13 (West 1971).
106. [d. § 116B.03(1).

122

Harvard Environmental Law Review

[Vol. 7:107

an environmental quality standard or regulation, or as "conduct which
materially adversely affects or is likely to materially adversely affect the
environment. "107 Somewhat surprisingly, no cases directly addressing
thresholds of harm have been decided, although this provision appears
to be more favorable to defendants than is MEPA.
In interpreting MERA, the Minnesota courts have stressed substance
rather than thresholds and held that the state's natural resources should
be given paramount consideration's" within a balancing test that weighs
the utility of a defendant's conduct against the gravity of the harm allegedly resulting from that conduct. 109 Rather than presenting a threshold
that the plaintiffs must meet in order to obtain review on the merits, the
existence of enviromental harm is merely one factor in determining
whether relief will be granted. In practice, once the courts have found
that an activity is likely to impair the environment, they have tended to
discount defendants' counterarguments of utility. lID
Plaintiffs under MERA typically have not found it difficult to make
a prima facie showing of environmental damage. In County of Freeborn
ex rei Tuveson v. Bryson.t" a farmer brought an action to enjoin the
construction of a highway across a marsh. The court found that the
plaintiff's evidence, that the highway would disturb the "quietness and
solitude of the marsh"l12 and increase animal fatalities, constituted a
prima facie case.!" The case reappeared before the Minnesota Supreme
Court when an alternative highway route was challenged by the same
parties. 114 Here, the court again granted the requested injunction, holding
that the alternative of rerouting the highway through a second farmer's
land was "feasible and prudent." Although the alternative would force
the shortening of the second farmer's crop rows, the court stated that
this was not a "factor of unusual or extraordinary significance" relative
107. Id, § 116B.02(5) (emphasis added). As is provided by MEPA, the defendant may
rebut the plaintiff's prima facie showing by submitting evidence to the contrary, or by way
of an affirmative defense may show that there is no "feasible and prudent alternative" and
that the alleged damage to the environment is "consistent with and reasonably required for
the promotion of the public health, safety and welfare •..." Id. § 116B.04.
108. ld. § 116B.04. See also State ex rei. Powderly v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84
(1979).
109. See SST. Inc. v, Minneapolis, 288 N.W.2d 225 (Minn. 1979);Minnesota Public
Interest Research Group v. White Bear Rod & Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 1977).
110. In one case that appears to be contrary, State ex rei. Skeie v, Minnkota Power
Coop., Inc., 281 N.W.2d 372 (Minn. 1979), the court did find against the plaintiffs, but the
basis of the holding was a finding that the construction of a power line across the plaintiffs'
land would not constitute pollution, impairment or destruction. The court held that the
presence of the power line would make use of the land more difficult, but that it would not
harm the environment. Id. at 374. The balancing test, which presumably would have
weighed the utility of the power lines against the damage done to the landowners' interest,
was not reached.
111. 297 Minn. 218. 210 N.W.2d 290 (1973).
112. ld. at 226, 210 N.W.2d at 297.
113. ld.
114. County of Freeborn ex rei. Tuveson v. Bryson, 309 Minn. 178,243 N.W.2d 316
(1976).
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to the environmental harm that the injunction would prevent. liS In another case!" the court found that, while economic as well as environmental impacts may be weighed in the balancing test, a court should only
base its decision on economic factors when the environmental harm is
remote and speculative and the economic impact would be certain and
devastating. 117
Additional examples further enforce the view that plaintiffs need
satisfy only a low threshold of harm while defenses are scrutinized rigorously. One case held that a gun club's operation of a trapshooting
facility would create noise pollution and pollute a nearby wetlands area
with lead shot. us The club was enjoined from operating its facility when
it failed to prove that there was no feasible alternative to its present
location and method of operation.!" In another case,120 a city which
owned row houses was enjoined from demolishing the houses when the
plaintiff historical society made a prima facie case that the houses were
"historical resouces" protected by the statute.!" In terms of the promotion of the public health, safety and welfare, the court held renovation
to be preferable to demolition.'>
Although MERA defines environmental damage in a manner that
imposes a higher express threshold of harm than does MEPA, MERA
specifically states that "economic considerations alone shall not constitute [an affirmative] defense."I23 In practice, however, MERA differs
little from MEPA.

2. Other State Statutes
Five other states have enacted statutes that grant some right of
citizen standing in environmental disputes: South Dakota, Connecticut,
Florida, New Jersey, and Indiana. Of these, the South Dakota statute'>
is most similar to MEPA; it incorporates the exact wording of various
provisions of the Michigan slatute. l2S However, the few reported
115. [d. at 188,243 N.W.2d at 321.
116. Reserve Mining Co. v, Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808 (Minn. 19n).
117. [d. at 841. Indeed, MERA specifically excludes economic considerations from
the affirmative defense when the defendant has no other defenses. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 1168.04 (West 1971).
118. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v, White Bear Rod & Gun Club, 257
N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 1977).
119. [d. The plaintiff in this case relied only on two noise tests and evidence of local
opinion to show that harm would result. No showing of a specified minimum level of noise
pollution was required, because applicable standards had not yet been developed by the
state Pollution Control Agency. [d. at 770-71.
120. State ex rei. Powderly v, Erickson. 285 N.W.2d 84 (1979).
121. [d. at 90.
122. [d. at 89.
123. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.04.
124. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 34A-Io-I to -15 (1973).
125. For example, the two acts share the same general standing provision, although
that in SDEPA is shorter than that in MEPA. Compare S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34A-
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decisions under the statute have held against the plaintiffs, stressing the
plaintiffs' burden of providing substantial evidence that pollution is occuring or is about to occur as a result of defendants' conduct. 126 Although
those cases may merely call for more certain proof that harm will occur,
a better view is that plaintiffs must adduce sufficient evidence to satisfy
a nontrivial threshold of harm requirement.
The Connecticut Environmental Protection Act,127 like MEPA, is
grounded in the "public trust" doctrine.P" which holds that any harm to
the environment is a violation of a right held in trust by the state for its
citizens.P? Whereas MEPA protects the "air, water and other natural
resources and the public trust therein,"130 CEPA protects only the "public
trust in the air, water or other natural resources."!" The vagueness of
these terms has enabled some courts to deny relief. 132
Although relief has been granted in a number of actions'" under
New Jersey's Environmental Rights Act,134 the statute has not generally
been given the broad construction anticipated for it.13S In part, the courts
may have been responding to the legislative history, which shows that
10-1 with MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 691.1202. In addition, the South Dakota statute
reproduced MEPA's provisions on defendant's rebuttal of the prima facie case and the
establishment of affirmative defenses. Compare S.D. CODIFIED'LAWS ANN. §§ 34A-IQ-9
to -10 with MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 691.1203.
126. See In re Solid Waste Disposal Permit Application, 295 N.W.2d 328 (S.D. 1980):
In re Solid Waste Disposal Permit Application, 268 N.W.2d 599 (S.D. 1978).
127. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-14 to -20 (West 1971). See generally Johnson,
The Environmental Protection Act of 1971,46 CONN. B.J. 422 (1972).
Under the Connecticut act, a plaintiff can make a prima facie showing of harm only
by demonstrating that the defendant's conduct "has, or is reasonably likely unreasonably
to pollute, impair or destroy the public trust in the air, water or other natural resources of
the state ... :' CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-17 (emphasis added). The defendant may
rebut by showing evidence to the contrary or may establish that no feasible and prudent
alternative exists and that his or her conduct is "consistent with the reasonable requirements
of the public health. safety and welfare:' Id.
128. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-15; MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 691.1202(1).
129. See generally Carlson, The Public Trust and Urban Waterfront Development in
Massachusetts: What is a Public Purpose? 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 71 (1983).
130. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 691.1202(1).
131. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22c-17.
132. See. e.g .. Belford V. City of New Haven. 170 Conn. 46, 52, 364 A.2d 194, 199
(I973) (denying injunction against construction of proposed rowing course in part on the
ground that the public trust was not directly threatened) (1975). But cf: Brecciaroli v,
Connecticut Cornm'r of Envtl. Protection. 362 A.2d 948. 953 (Conn. 1975)(court applied a
balancing test and found that the environmental harm would outweigh the utility to the
landowner: because the landowner was free to modify his proposal and submit further
permit applications. the denial of the landowner's application was held not to constitute an
unconstitutional taking).
133. See. e.g .. Birchwood Lakes Colony Club, Inc. V. Borough of Medford Lakes,
179 N.J. Super. 409. 432 A.2d 525 (1981); Department of Transp. v, PSC Resources. Inc.,
159 N.J. Super. 154.387 A.2d 393 (l978).
134. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:35A-I to -14 (West 1971).
135. See Department of Transp. V. PSC Resources, lnc., 159 N.J. Super. 154, 387
A.2d 393 (I978).

1983]

Thresholds under MEPA

125

language designed to restrict the scope of the statute was inserted to
prevent the harassment suits predicted by those opposing the bill. 136 Like
MEPA, the New Jersey act authorizes injunctive relief when a defendant's conduct violates an environmental statute or regulation, as well
as when the conduct is otherwise harmful to the environment.P? An
exclusionary clause, however, provides that the Act will not apply when
the defendant's harmful conduct is regulated by "a more specific standard" than the ERA.138 At least one court has used this exclusionary
clause to deny relief.!"
Indiana's statute on Special Jurisdiction and Procedure in Environmental Suits l40 differs from MEPA in two important respects.!" by requiring a showing of "significant" pollution, impairment or destruction,142
and by allowing the defendant to rebut this showing through evidence of
compliance with applicable pollution standards.l" Although there has
been no judicial construction of the term "significant" harm, the few
reported cases under the statute have shown an inclination to interpret
the Act restrictively. 144
Finally, The Florida Environmental Protection Act14S differs substantially from MEPA in that Florida citizens may bring actions only to
136. As enacted, the statute provides relief from "any actual pollution, impairment,
or destruction." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:35A-3(b) (West 1971)(emphasis added). An earlier
version would have provided for relief from conduct that was "likely to pollute, impair or
destroy." Goldshore, supra note 103, at 19 (emphasis added). The Act provides specifically
for the immediate dismissal of any action "which on its face appears to be patently frivolous,
harassing or wholly lacking in merit". N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A,:35A-4(c).
137. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:35A-4(a)-(b).
138. [d. § 2A:35A-4(b).
139. See Borough of Kenilworth v, Department of Transp., 151 N.J. Super. 322, 376
A.2d 1266 (1977), in which a borough sought an injunction against the widening of a state
highway, claiming potential air and water pollution and drainage problems. The court held
that a plan approved by the Federal Highway Administration, finding that the proposed
"widening would have no environmentally negative impact, constituted a "more specific
standard" under the clause so as to require dismissal of the action under the New Jersey
statute. [d. at 335, 376 A.2d at 1273.
Although the court ultimately did not invoke any environmental protection statute, it
nevertheless seemed to weigh the prospective harm against the usefulness of the project.
In response to the borough's assertion that the widening of the highway would result in a
problem of rodent infestation, the court ruled that "[t]he claimed threat to the environment
is not sufficient to warrant the court interfering with the completion of this important public
project." [d.
140. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-6-1-1 to -6 (Burns 1981).
141. Like MEPA, the Indiana statute provides for declaratory and equitable relief
when the defendant's conduct has or is reasonably likely to harm the environment. [d.
§ 13-6-1-l(e). The defendant may raise the same affirmative defense of reasonableness and
a lack of "feasible and prudent" alternatives to the proposed conduct. [d. § 13-6-1-2.
142. [d. §"13-6-1-1(a).
143. [d. § 13-6-1-2.
144. See, e.g., Sekerez v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 337 N.E.2d 521 (Ind.
1975). The court, in denying standing to a plaintiff seeking compliance with air pollution
standards, stated that "[t]he general tenor of [the Indiana statute's] provisions is restrictive
.•. ." [d. at 525.
145. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412 (West 1971).
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compel government authorities to enforce existing environmental laws,
rules and regulations.!" In effect, the Florida statute excludes cases on
the basis of subject matter, rather than by employing a threshold of harm
requirement. 147
Thus, the experience in other states reinforces the conclusion that
citizen standing provisions do not open the floodgates of litigation. The
Minnesota experience supports the thesis that MEPA-like statutes work
well when a low threshold is employed. The experience in other jurisdictions must be viewed more cautiously, in light of the differing legislative
histories and statutory provisions there at work.

B. Comparison with Three Federal Statutes
Statutory interpretation must of course be guided by statutory purpose. The substantiality of any threshold requirement imposed by MEPA
should thus be consistent with MEPA's intent to provide an environmental remedy of broad applicability. This point is further illustrated in
three major federal environmental statutes: the Endangered Species Act
(ESA),I48 the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),I49 and the
Clean Water Act. ISO Each statute has its own internal logic. The ESA
has a narrow applicability, a narrow (though critical) purpose, and a high
threshold; NEPA has a broad applicability, an institutional rather than a
substantive purpose, and a medium threshold; and the Clean Water Act
has a narrow subject matter of applicability, a comprehensive substantive
purpose in that area, and no threshold.

1. Catastrophe Avoidance: The Endangered Species Act
The Endangered Species Act is a statute of narrow scope. Its legislative history shows that Congress was explicitly concerned with the
avoidance of environmental catastrophes resulting from the elimination
of plant and animal species. A House of Representatives committee
report issued during consideration of the Act expresses the urgency of
this concern: "As we homogenize the habitats in which these plants and
animals evolved, and as we increase the pressure for products that they
are in a position to supply (usually unwillingly) we threaten their - and
146. Id. § 403.412(2)(a)(I)-(2).
147. It should be noted, however, that the Act is only one part of a comprehensive
legislative scheme; presumably almost any environmentally harmful activity would be in
violation of one of the state's environmentally related statutes. See the Environmental
Reorganization Act, id. § 403.801-817 (1975); the Florida Litter Law of 1971, ld. § 403.413;
the Electrical Power Plant Siting Act of 1973, id. § 403.501-517; the Safe Drinking Water
Act of 1977. id. § 403.850-864: and a provision creating a Department of Pollution Control,
id. § 403.045.
148. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980).
149. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4369 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
150. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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our own - genetic heritage. The value of this heritage is, quite literally,
incalculable. "lSI
The Endangered Species Act need not be a statute of universal
application to achieve its intended results. Although all plant and animal
species potentially fall under its protection.F' the occasions for its use
in litigation are limited. The Act requires that the Department of Interior
publish a list of endangered species and a corresponding inventory of
habitat considered critical to the continued survival of listed species.F'
Thereafter, all federal actions adversely affecting listed species or their
habitat must not "jeopardize the continued existence of such endangered
species. "154 Although the statute contains a citizen suit provision, ISS that
provision applies only to litigation involving listed species.!" A decision
. not to place a species on the endangered list can be challenged only under
the general provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. 15? Thus,
judicial intervention under the Endangered Species Act is reserved for
cases involving an administratively defined threshold of importance; the
judicial role is otherwise restricted to pre-existing, highly deferential
modes of review of administrative activity. 158
A comparison of ESA and MEPA discloses widely divergent degrees
of legislative reliance on the judicial process. These differences functionally correspond to the very different motives behind the enactment of
the statutes and in tum affect the scope of their applicability. ESA
entrusts the Department of Interior with the crucial task of preparing a
list of the most immediately threatened species and calls on sister agencies to avoid harming these species. The courts play a secondary role,
stepping in when agencies fail to comply with these mandates. MEPA,
on the other hand, empowers the courts to review agency performance
directly and to modify agency procedures and standards found to be
inadequate.!" Far from limiting the judiciary's role to a preselected,
urgent set of cases, MEPA's broad applicability and liberal standing
provisions invite citizens to participate, by way of the judicial process,
in the enforcement of environmental protection at all levels. To the extent
that ESA and MEPA appear to be at opposite "ends of the legislative
spectrum, ESA's unusually high threshold of harm is the counterpoint to
MEPA's unusually low threshold.

151. H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1973).
152. 16 U.S.C. § 153l(a)(I).
153. Id. § 1533(c)(1).
154. Id. § 1536.
155. Id. § 154O(g).
156. Id. § 1540(g)(1). See also id. §§ 1533(d), 1538.
157. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559,701-706 (1976). See also 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(2).
158. See generally S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
LATORY POLICY 195 (1979).
159. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 691.1202(1) (Supp. 1982).
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2. Major Project Control: The National Environmental Policy Act
NEPA has become one of the major tools of environmental regulation."? By requiring that federal agencies prepare environmental impact
statements (EISs) for "major Federal actions ... significantly affecting
the human environment,"161 NEPA creates an explicit threshold of harm.
Many states have adopted similar legislation.F' A consideration of the
impact statement requirement within NEPA's statutory structure highlights the differences between the goals and purposes of judicial review
under NEPA and MEPA.
NEPA creates a means for taking into account the environmental
consequences .of federal activities. The statute first declares a national
policy of promoting "efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to
the environment."163 More specifically, NEPA's EIS requirements establish an institutional mechanism for incorporating environmental values
into planning by all branches of the federal government.l'" NEPA sup-

160. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4369 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See generally R. LIROFF, A
NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEPA AND ITS AFTERMATH (1976). NEPA's
broad, deliberately vague language and wide application to federal actions have led one
commentator to describe it as a potential "environmental bill of rights." Coggins, Preparing
an Environmental Impact Lawsuit, Part l: Defining a Claim for Relief Under the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969. 58 IOWA. L. REV. 277, 287 (1972). Suits demanding
compliance with NEPA's EIS requirement have been brought by environmental groups,
private plaintiffs, and state governments; plaintiffs within industry can also invoke NEPA
to challenge environmentally protective federal actions. In the ten years following the Act's
inception in 1970, nearly 1300 suits were brought under the Act. Liroff, NEPA Litigation
in the 1970's: A Deluge or a Dribble?, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 315, 321 (1981). In 1979 only
20% of all plaintiffs under the Act were environmental groups. [d. at 325.
161. § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). This requirement has been a staple
of environmental litigation for over a decade. See generally F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW9-1 to 9-152.1 (1979); R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND POLICY 733-810 (1978 & Supp. 1982).
162. See generally Pearlman, State Environmental Policy Acts: Local Declslonmaking and Land Use Planning, 43 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 42 (1977).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
164. Id. § 4332(2)(c). This method of environmental protection has a number of
important limitations. First, NEPA addresses environmental impacts only prospectively.
The statute provides no relief once projects have been approved. Even a proposal entailing
"adverse impacts which cannot be avoided" may be approved for implementation. Id. Such
impacts must be detailed by the statement. Second, those people affected by the proposed
project. including citizens who live in the area. enter the process only tangentially. Although
individuals and interest groups may comment on draft impact statements and bring suit to
challenge decisions not to prepare a statement. id.• they cannot initiate the process and are
essentially restricted to responding to the study produced by the agency that sponsors the
project. These rights are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551·
556.701-706 (1976). Federal courts reviewing agency decisions not to prepare environmental
impact statements are restricted to the narrow "arbitrary and capricious" standard of
review. See Hanly v. Kleindienst. 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972). But see Save Our Ten Acres
v. Kreger. 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973) (appellate court ordered trial court, on remand, to
apply the "reasonableness" test to decisions not to prepare an environmental impact
statement).
Finally. because the requirement of an impact statement only applies to "major"
"federal" actions that "significantly" affect the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), it does
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plements the EIS process with a special agency created to review and
appraise the government's environmental policiesl 6S and with a requirement of agency self-scrutiny. 166
These three requirements were all designed to further the goal of
establishing sound environmental practices for a large and unwieldy bureaucracy. Within this framework, Congress tempered the operation of
the environmental impact statement process by limiting its applicability
to activities meeting an explicit threshold of harm, namely that of "major"
actions that have "significant" environmental effects. The reasons for
this may have included the goal of lessening the overall burden on the
agencies or a desire to establish two levels of projects and thereby insure
comparatively more intensive environmental scrutiny of some projects.
Limiting the environmental impact statement requirement, however, does
not impede the operation of the other methods provided by NEPA to
ensure that all federal decisions respect environmental values. NEPA
focuses on the ongoing business of government, rather than on providing
case-specific protection; the moderate threshold that triggers EIS preparation is thus consistent with the statute's overall design.
3. Universal Applicability: The Clean Water Act
Judicial enforcement of the Endangered Species Act is limited to
situations involving resources that an administrative agency has determined to be critically important.'s? judicial enforcement of NEPA's EIS
provision is restricted by a threshold of harm. l 68 In contrast, those

not reach purely private behavior nor federal actions deemed to be too minor or to have
too indirect an effect on the environment to .necessitate the preparation of an impact
statement. See, e.g., Movement Against Destruction v, Volpe, 361 F. Supp. 1360 (D.C.
Md. 1973), aff'd, 500 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1974) (Federal Highw.a,y Administrator's letter
approving state highway project was not sufficient federal involvement to require preparation of an EIS); Bradford Township v, Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 463 F.2d 537
(7th Cir. 1972) (no EIS was required for state toll highway when there was no allegation
of federal participation in its construction or funding). Such actions may have significant
local effects, however, or may in combination with existing conditions have greater effects
than could be predicted through initial threshold analyses.
Such was the case in Rucker v, Willis, 358 F. Supp. 425 (E.D.N.C. 1973), aff'd, 484
F.2d 158(4th Cir. 1973),where the court ruled that the Army Corps of Engineers' decision
to grant a permit for the construction of a marina, parking lot, boat basin, and fishing basin
.without first preparing an EIS was not arbitrary and capricious. But see Simmons v, Grant,
370 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Tex. 1974) ("The setting [of the project) should not be artificially
large, thus diluting the actual impact on the immediate area .•. .").
One case in which the importance of cumulative impacts was recognized is Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Calloway, 524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir, 1975). There, the wastes
from a dredging project proposed by the Navy were to be dumped in a "containment site"
where they would not disperse into Long Island Sound. The Navy's EIS was held to be
arbitrary and capricious for failure to consider the cumulative impact of other pending
projects, which would generate a total of two million cubic feet of waste.
165. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
166. [d. § 4333.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 152-58.
168. See supra text accompanying note 161.
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provisions of the Clean Water Act l69 that regulate industrial discharges
of water pollutants are subject to rigorous judicial enforcement.F" The
Clean Water Act's stated goal is the eventual elimination of all effluent
discharges into the nation's water.'?' For polluters who claim that
their effluent does not significantly affect water quality, the Act provides neither exemption nor variance.!" EPA and the public'" can seek
judicial enforcement of effluent limitations, even when to do so greatly
burdens the polluter without corresponding enhancement of water quality.174 Nor does the Act require a judicial or administrative finding that a
particular threshold of harm has been exceeded. All violations, no matter
how slight, are actionable.
A recent challenge to this claimed stringency prompted a thorough
study of the Clean Water Act's language and structure by the United
State Supreme Court. In E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,175
industrial dischargers sought a judicial ruling that would force EPA to
make case-by-case determinations that the pollution controls required by
the Act could be justified in terms of reduced pollution. They claimed
that EPA lacked authority "to issue industrywide [sic] regulations limiting
discharges by existing plants, "176 and asserted that EPA must allow a
variance procedure in regard to new sources. In
The Supreme Court held that the legislation did not require EPA to
make site-specific determinations of environmental benefits.!" Although
169. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976).
170. The Clean Water Act is the most complex of the environmental statutes discussed in this article. In addition to industrial point source discharges of pollutants, the
Act also deals with municipal effluents, id. § 1314, non-point sources, id. §§ 1321-1322, and
reservoirs, id. § 1252(a), and makes extensive provision for research and study of many
aspects of water pollution, id, §§ 1254-1255. In regulating industrial discharge, the Clean
Water Act uses a permit system. See generally id. §§ 1341-1345. No discharge into the
navigable waters of the United States is allowed without a permit. Id. § 1342. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the permit granting agency, unless a State promulgates a qualifying permit system of its own.ld. § 1342(a)-(d). The standards which the EPA
must incorporate into the permits are to be established by reference to technological
capabilities for pollution control. id. §§ 1342(a)(l), 1316.
171. ld. § l3ll(b)-(c).
172. Variances from the long-term goal of installing the best available technology, ld.
§ 131l(b)(2)(A). may be granted under the Act when the economic consequences to an
individual operator would force plant closure, ide § 131l(c)(l). The statute provides no
variance procedure relating to the short-term goal of installing the best practicable technology. /d. § l3lI(b)(1)(A).
173. Id. § 1365 (citizen suit provision).
174. See infra text accompanying notes 178-83 .
175. 430 U.S. 1I2 (1977).
176. Id. at lIS.
177. Id.
178.
The petitioner's view of the Act would place an impossible burden on EPA. It would require
EPA to give individual consideration to the circumstances of each of the more than 42,000
dischargers who have applied for permits •.. and to issue or approve all these permits well in
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the Court imposed variance procedures that tempered the universal impact of the congressionally prescribed standard, it did so in only a limited
fashion.P? The Court found actual effluent reduction to be unimportant
and economic impact of regulations to be relevant only to the extent
authorized by the specific textual language and legislative history .180
Invoking Congress's decision to enact the statute without a threshold
of environmental harm, the Supreme Court also explicitly rejected judicial authority to make the statute's operation more "appropriate to the
regulatory process."!" The Fourth Circuit had ruled that, although the
Clean Water Act did not contain any variance procedure for new sources
of effluent, EPA was nevertheless obliged to create one. 182 The Supreme
Court roundly criticized this judicial revision of the Act:
The question, however, is not what a court thinks is generally appropriate
to the regulatory process; it is what Congress intended for these regulations.
It is clear that Congress intended these regulations to be absolute prohibitions. The use of the word "standards" implies as much, as does the
description of the preferred standard as one "permitting no discharge of
pollutants. "183

The Clean Water Act offers two lessons for MEPA's proper interpretation. First, thresholds of harm are not an ordinary part of statutes
intended to be of universal applicability within their appointed sphere of
operation. Second, legislative intent is crucial in determining statutory
content. Once a legislature strikes the balance between environmental
benefits and social costs, either costs of control or costs of litigation, this
issue is not available for judicial reconsideration.
CONCLUSION

•

Actions brought under MEPA have included cases of comparatively
minor environmental damage.P' as the state legislature intended when it
promulgated the ACt. 185 MEPA was designed to establish an opportunity
advance of the 1977deadline in order to give industry time to install the necessary pollutioncontrol equipment. We do not believe that Congress would have failed so conspicuously to
provide EPA with the authority needed to achieve these statutory goals.

[d. at 132-33.
179. [d. The Court disagreed only with the EPA's distinction between "effluent
limitations for point sources" and "effluent limitations for categories and classes of point
sources." See. e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 131l(b)(2)(A).
180. See 430 U.S. at 129-30.
181. 430 U.S. at 138.
182. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018, 1028 (4th Cir. 1976)
(Du Pont II).
183. 430 U.S. at 138.
184. See supra text accompanying note 48.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 16-30.
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for citizens, interest groups, the private sector, and government agencies
alike to redress their various grievances concerning environmental issues
through the judiciary. MEPA's express private right of action thus brings
a wide range of activities within the scope of the courts' duty to protect
natural resources.l" in contrast with statutes that apply only to a specific
area' of environmental protection!" or that only address emergency
situations.P' The courts have helped to further MEPA's broad purpose
by facilitating plaintiffs' efforts to establish a prima facie case l89 while
holding defendants to a more severe standard in rebutting the plaintiffs'
evidence or establishing affirmative defenses."?
The practical experience of courts, both under MEPA and in other
states with similar statutes;'?' shows that the courts have neither been
inundated by environmental! lawsuits nor dismissed cases that merit a
hearing. One likely explanation for the success of such broad private
rights of action is that both courts and litigants are intuitively aware of
the typical elements of a plausible case. If articulated explicitly, these
elements establish guidelines that would help decrease the ad hoc nature
of litigation under such statutes.
The first of these elements, drawn from cases brought under MEPA,
is the presence of a threat to unique resources. When a defendant's
activity will affect a rare quaking bog,l92 an elk herd,193 or a similarly
unique resource, the appropriateness ofMEPA review is clear. A second
characteristic of a number of MEPA cases is that a fairly large number
of resource users would be affected by the proposed action.P' Examples
include the regulation of the deer herd throughout the State of Michigan!"
or regulation of all types of fishing in Grand Traverse Bay and adjacent
parts of Lake Michigan.P" The third element justifying plenary MEPA
review is, of course, a finding that the severity of the threatened harm
to the resource base and its users is substantial.
In contrast to applying the criteria of uniqueness or effects on a large
class of resource users, assessing substantiality of impact requires subtle
186. By contrast. NEPA's EIS requirement, which affects only "major" actions with
"significant" potential effects. is part of a broader environmental protection program.
See id.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 169-83.
188. See supra text accompanying notes lSI-59.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 31-54.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 65-79.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 102-47.
192. Ray v. Mason County Drain Cornm'r, 393 Mich. 294, 224 N.W. 883 (1975).
193. Pigeon River, 405 Mich. 741. 275 N.W.2d 538 (1979).
194. It is noteworthy that all public trust cases satisfy this criterion of importance,
thereby necessitating fulljudicial review under MEPA. By definition. public trust resources
are held by the state for the benefit of the entire public. See supra note 129.
195. Payant v, Department of Natural Resources, No. 1100(Dickinson County Cir,
Ct. July 13. 1971).
196. Michigan United Conservation Clubs v, Anthony, 90 Mich. App. 99, 280N.W.2d
883 (1979).
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judicial decisionmaking. Beyond merely cataloging environmental causes
and effects, calculating substantiality of harm may involve evaluating the
degree of aggregate damage"? that would occur if other parallel projects
were undertaken. Further, the impacts should be evalutated within the
particular project's local context.
The courts have traditionally been perplexed by cases in which
environmental harm worthy of judicial intervention exists only as a result
of aggregate consequences.P" Even a low threshold of harm requirement
applied to a single environmentally injurious act may leave such cases
outside the reach of MEPA and frustrate its ability to regulate the "nibbling phenonema. "199 Aggregating effects is not new to the judiciaryf"
and will not require that all cases be given plenary review on the ground
that any type of activity could significantly affect the environment "if
everyone did it." Reasoned application of an aggregation principle invites
limitation by inquiry into the harm' anticipated and the possibility of
parallel activity by others.P'
Directly assessing the substantiality of environmental harm also
raises important questions of context.202 As the mistaken approach of the
appellate court in Kimberly Hills shows,203 context or perspective is
crucial in determining whether harm is significant or inconsequential. If
MEPA is to be given full application, the local context of the project or
proposal is the relevant concern. Within that context it may be helpful
to judges to focus On the users of the resource base and the effects a
project will have on their activites.P' By identifying the impact on users,
courts assure themselves that there are human values attached to abstract

197. The aggregate effect or several projects occasionally exceeds the mere sum of
environmental damage done by the projects individually. Problems of synergism occur in
many environmental contexts. See P. EHRLICH, A. EHRLICH & J. HOLDREN, ECOSCIENCE:
POPULATION, RESOURCES, AND ENVIRONMENT 727-28 (1977).
198. See, e.g., Maine v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).
199. The term "nibbling phenomena" is adapted from testimony given by the Director
of Michigan's Department of Natural Resources: "I can't honestly say that the loss of five
or six miles of stream of this size is a manjor environmental impact .... It is the assemblage
of these small nibbles ..•. You have to take them in broad perspective and then you begin
to get the significant impact." See Tanton v. Department of Natural Resources, No. 90-3,
slip op. at 35 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Dec. 30 1972).
200. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. III (1942) (aggregation of conduct by
individual farmers consituting a regulable impact on interstate commerce).
201. The two lines of inquiry in aggregation cases must include a finding that in sum
the environmental harm would be significant and that a chance exists that other similar
actions will occur. For example in both Maine v, Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970), and
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. III (1942), the potential actors had positive economic incentive to follow the litigants' course of action.
202. Cf. Abrams, Governmental Expansion ofRecreational Water Use Opportunities,
59 OR. L. REV. 159, 188-90 (1980) (discussing relative recreational values of water bodies
as a function of suitability for use).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 55-64.
204. This approach is consonant with a traditional concern with standing in environmental litigation. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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ecological sensitivities, a process which lends greater objectivity to the
inquiry.205
Thus, by aggregating effects and looking at local context, courts can
ascertain whether individual cases of seemingly slight environmental moment are nevertheless as much within MEPA's broad reach as are cases
that threaten unique resources or that affect large user populations.
The establishment of these elements as general guides through the
common law development of vague statutory language helps support the
view that an explicit threshold of harm need not be a prerequisite to the
viable implementation of a broad private right of action. The alternative
screening devices offer points of reference to the judge who feels that a
case is so wholly lacking in impact that it is unworthy of any judicial
consideration. When any element is present, however, MEPA appropriately is employed to improve environmental quality, consistent with the
legislative purpose.

205. Muha v. Union Lake Assocs., No. 2964 (Grand Traverse County Cir. Ct. Aug.
14. 1972),for example, involved the effect of a land development project on local streams.
Following the advocated analysis, the court would be concerned with the number of sportfishing opportunities that are threatened by siltation of a trout stream resulting from poor
erosion control. The court need not decide in the abstract that a certain percentage increase
in turbidity ofa short stream segment either passes or fails MEPA's low threshold of harm.

